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Abstract 
After  the  February  2001 crisis, Turkey  started to implement  a  new  economic 
program, one of the aims of which was to reduce the public debt that jumped to a record 
high level. The resulting fiscal consolidation was rather exceptional. By the end of 2006, 
public  debt-to-GDP  ratio  declined  by  43  percentage  points.  Notwithstanding  this 
outstanding  fiscal  consolidation,  the  average  growth  rate  attained  in  this  period  was 
almost twice of the long-term growth rate. Given the shallowness of the Turkish financial 
markets  leading  to  credit  constraints,  it  is  tempting  to  ask  reasons  behind  this 
performance. We argue that fiscal consolidation sharply reduced default risk, increased 
business confidence, improved banks’ and non-financial firms’ balance sheets causing a 
significant rise in supply of and demand for credit. Both the improvement in balance 
sheets of the private sector and decrease in option value of waiting boosted private sector 
demand. 
Keywords:  Fiscal  policy;  Public  debt  stabilisation;  Credit  constraints;  Confidence; 
Aggregate demand 
JEL classification numbers: E21; E22; E51; E62; H31; H32 
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I. Introduction 
Just three months after the 2001 February crisis, Turkey started to implement a 
new economic program. The fiscal consolidation, especially that of the 2003-05 period 
was  rather  remarkable.  There  were  two  more  fiscal  consolidation  efforts  in  last  two 
decades: 1994-95 and 2000. The 2003-05 episode was unique in sharply reducing public 
debt, real interest rates and inflation, leading to a sustained growth during and after the 
fiscal consolidation episode both relative to other emerging economies and in absolute 
terms, building confidence, and triggering a significant credit growth. 
Expansionary  fiscal  consolidations  are  seen  elsewhere  as  well.  Giavazzi  and 
Pagano  (1990)  show  that  private  demand  grew  vigorously  despite  a  reduction  in  the 
budget  deficit of  7.2  percent  in  Denmark  during  1983-86,  and  5.7  percent  in  Ireland 
during 1987-89. Alesina and Perotti (1996) identify five more such episodes: Belgium 
1984-87,  Canada  1986-88,  Italy  1989-92,  Portugal  1984-86,  and  Sweden  1983-89. 
Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) find that for a panel of nineteen OECD countries sharp and 
persistent fiscal actions have non-standard effects on private consumption. Giavazzi et al. 
(2000) and Giavazzi et al. (2005), using a larger data set, confirm these findings. 
Fiscal  consolidation  causes  expansion  mainly  through  two  channels:  by 
increasing confidence and decreasing default probability especially in economies with 
high public debt –the credibility channel- and increasing expected permanent income –the 
expectations channel. For the second channel to be operative, private agents should not be 
credit constrained.
1 Looked at from this perspective there are two important features of 
the Turkish economy to be considered: In the aftermath of the 2001 crisis, the banking 
                                                 
1 The early 1980 fiscal consolidation in Ireland led to standard Keynesian results, whereas the 
1987-89 fiscal consolidation was expansionary. Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) state that one of the 
main reasons underlying the expansionary effects of the second Irish stabilization was a rise in 
consumer lending. See also, Blanchard (1990), Perotti (1999) and the discussion in Section II.   2 
sector in Turkey was in turbulence requiring immediate action. The rescue operation sky-
rocketed the  public  debt-to-GDP  ratio  (to  104  percent  from  54  percent).  Second,  the 
Turkish financial system is shallow compared to those of the countries whose experiences 
are analyzed in the studies cited above. For example, the credit to GDP ratio was merely 
one fourth of the average of the enlarged European Union in 2006. 
Two  questions  follow:  First,  given  credit  constraints,  how  did  the  Turkish 
economy  enjoy  a  sustained  high  growth  period  during  and  after  the  2003-05  fiscal 
consolidation both relative to its counterparts and long-term growth? Second, why did the 
2003-05  consolidation  lead  to  significantly  different  results  than  the  first  two?  The 
purpose  of this  study  is  to  draw  lessons  and  shed some  light  on  further  research  by 
answering these questions. 
We  show  that  while  both  channels  were  operative  in  the  2003-05  fiscal 
consolidation episode, the 2000 program suffered from extreme weakness in the banking 
sector and consequently failed. The 1994-95 consolidation episode faced important credit 
constraints: during the 1990’s consumer loans were almost non-existent. Moreover, fiscal 
consolidation effort short-lived and first seeds of the deterioration in the balance sheets of 
the  banking  sector  were  thrown  during  this  period.  This  experience  shows  that    in 
addition to initial conditions generally mentioned in the literature such as the level of 
public debt, the strength of the balance sheets of the financial and corporate sectors is 
important as well. Without solving balance sheet weaknesses it is highly difficult, if not 
impossible, for a fiscal consolidation effort to be successful. The repercussion of this 
conclusion for empirical studies is that the panel studies should control for balance sheet 
differences between the countries.   3 
Our second main conclusion is related with the appropriate choice of the fiscal 
consolidation indicator. Despite the importance given to credibility channel in theory (a 
rise in confidence and a decline in risk premium on interest rates), the empirical research 
has  relied  almost  entirely  on  primary  budget  balance  figures,  which  exclude  interest 
payments,  to  identify  fiscal  consolidation  episodes.  While this  mismatch  between  the 
theoretical and empirical literatures is justified by abstracting from inflation adjustment, 
for further research one wonders whether fiscal consolidation episodes identified based 
on budget balance data inclusive of nominal or real interest payments will change the 
results  of  earlier  studies.
2 When  one  notes  that  the  empirical  literature  has  not  been 
conclusive  whether  high  public  debt  leads  to  non-Keynesian  effects  for  fiscal 
consolidation, this possibility may not be low. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. Next section motivates the article and shows 
its relation to the literature. The third section provides some stylized facts on the positive 
impact of fiscal consolidation on the banks’ and non-financial firms’ balance sheets. The 
fourth section, first, analyses the impact of macroeconomic discipline on the default risk. 
Then we turn to the relationship between default risk and business confidence. In the fifth 
section we analyze the determinants of private investment and consumption. We show 
that the post-crisis credit expansion and confidence build-up played an important role in 
rapid  consumption  and  investment  growth.  The  final  section  concludes.  Information 
regarding the data and its sources is provided in the appendix. 
                                                 
2 For example, Alesina and Perotti (1995, pp. 212) states that “…there is no universally accepted 
method of defining what part of the current budgetary position reflects an exogenous action. … 
For instance, should interest payments be adjusted for inflation? ... Addressing the second problem 
presents difficulties that are more practical in nature. … We largely take care of the inflation-
adjustment problem by excluding interest payments from our measures of the budgetary position 
of the government.” Afonso et al. (2006) stresses that by using total balance instead of primary 
balance, one may better capture benefits (lower interest rates) of consolidation.   
   4 
II. Motivation and Relation to the Literature 
Importance of public debt and credit constraints  
If the initial value of public debt is high and there are widespread concerns on the 
sustainability of debt, a credible fiscal consolidation now minimises dept repudiation risk 
in the future. This immediately decreases the default premium leading to a significant 
decline in real interest rates. Moreover, the usual crowding-in channel is also effective in 
reducing  interest  rates.  This  is  the  credibility  channel.  Provided  that  the  fiscal 
consolidation is perceived as permanent and regarded credible, it signals an end to past 
lax policies. This means for economic agents that there is no more need for higher and 
distortionary  taxation  in  the  future,  causing  an  increase  in  the  expected  permanent 
income, which rises current level of private demand. This is the expectations channel. 
Especially  for  the  second  channel  to  be  effective,  the  share  of  credit-constrained 
consumers among total consumers should be low. 
Blanchard (1990) formalizes the expansionary effects of tax increases at high 
levels of debt. In his model, expansionary effects depend on two conditions: the less the 
consumers  are  credit  constrained  and  the  higher  the  level  of  debt  is,  the  higher  the 
likelihood of the expansionary effects. In the similar vein, Sutherland (1997) considers 
non-linear effects of debt. The model he develops has the property that at low levels of 
debt fiscal policy has the standard effects. On the contrary, at high levels of debt, fiscal 
policy works non-traditionally (consolidations have expansionary effects). Perotti (1999) 
also  emphasises  the  importance  of  debt  and  credit-constraints  on  whether  a  fiscal 
consolidation is going to be expansionary or contractionary. He shows that in times of 
“fiscal stress”, fiscal consolidations have very different effects on private consumption 
than in “normal times”. In the formal model he develops, the higher the initial level of   5 
public  debt  (fiscal  stress)  is,  the  higher  the  expected  future  tax  rate  will  be.  Such 
expectations render fiscal consolidation expansionary under a sufficiently high level of 
debt. He further shows that the less the consumers are credit constrained the higher the 
likelihood of the occurrence of expansionary fiscal consolidations is. 
Fiscal consolidation 
The first issue is to identify the relevant indicator of fiscal policy. The existing 
literature  generally  filters  out  the  impact  of  automatic  stabilizers  from  the  observed 
budget balance figures. One frequently employed method for the fiscal indicators of the 
developed  world  is  the  one  proposed  by  Blanchard  (1993),  which  cyclically  adjusts 
primary  budget  balance  for  year-to-year  changes  in  the  unemployment  rate.  Some 
researchers  raised  doubts  for  the  importance  of  automatic  stabilizers  for  emerging 
markets  and  the  developing  countries.  The  generally  stated  fact  is  the  absence  or 
unimportance of the unemployment benefits.
3 To overcome this shortcoming, Ortiz et al. 
(2007) adopt the method that has been applied in Chile since 2001, to extract the effect of 
macroeconomic fluctuations on fiscal accounts of their sample of emerging economies.
4 
They define the structural balance (including the interest payments) as the difference 
between  structural  fiscal  revenues  and  observed  fiscal  expenditures.  Structural  fiscal 
revenues are defined as the level of revenues that would be achieved if output were at its 
potential level. Note that by making use of structural balance, rather than the structural 
primary balance this method implicitly overcomes the mismatch problem stressed in the 
introduction.  
                                                 
3 See, for example, Purfield (2003, pp.48), Ortiz et al. (2007, pp. 8-9) and for the Turkish case see 
World Bank (2006, pp. 50-51).  
4 The methodology is explained in detail in Marcel et al. (2003).   6 
In what follows we use three alternative fiscal indicators. The first one is the 
cyclically adjusted primary budget balance as in Blanchard (1993). Second, the structural 
budget balance as defined in Ortiz et al. (2007) is used. The third one is the cyclically 
adjusted operational budget balance, which corrects the impact of inflation on cyclically 
adjusted budget balance but keeps the effect of real interest rate fluctuations. In the first 
and third indicators the cyclical adjustment is performed only for the budget revenues.
5 
The second issue is how to define a fiscal consolidation episode. Following the 
existing literature we focus on discretionary changes of fiscal policy. One commonly used 
definition of sharp fiscal consolidation is by Alesina and Ardagna (1998, pp. 496): “a 
period of fiscal adjustment is a year in which the cyclically adjusted primary balance 
improves by at least 2% of GDP, or a period of two consecutive years in which the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance improves by at least 1.5% of GDP per year, in both 
years.” Giavazzi and Pagano (1996) define a fiscal adjustment when the accumulated 
change in the cyclically adjusted primary balance is above 4, 3, and 2 percentage points 
of  GDP  respectively  in  four,  three  and  two  consecutive  years  or  the  change  is  of  3 
percentage points of potential GDP in one single year.
6 
Table  1  provides  the  evolution  of  three  alternative  measures  of  fiscal  policy 
mentioned above and the relevant fiscal impulses in the 1991-2006 period. In order to 
identify fiscal consolidation episodes, we use the definition proposed by Giavazzi and 
Pagano  (1996).  Since  the  three  indicators  are  based  on  three  different  concepts,  we 
slightly modify their definition: we select consolidation episodes if at least two of the 
three  indicators  agree  and  furthermore  if  the  third  indicator  does  not  indicate  a 
deterioration (a negative impulse) in the same period. 
                                                 
5 See appendix for details. 
6 See, also Aarle and Garretsen (2003) for these alternative definitions.   7 
Table 1. Fiscal policy indicators (% of GDP)
a
 Cyclically Cyclically 
adjusted adjusted
primary operational Structural Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal
balance balance balance impulse impulse impulse Public 
A B C At-At-1 Bt-Bt-1 Ct-Ct-1 debt
1990 0.5 -1.7 -3.3 36.6
1991 -1.4 -3.7 -5.1 -1.9 -2.0 -1.8 38.8
1992 -0.6 -2.8 -4.4 0.8 1.0 0.7 40.6
1993 -1.3 -4.3 -8.0 -0.7 -1.6 -3.6 40.1
1994 2.3 0.0 -4.2 3.5 4.4 3.8 52.2
1995 3.6 -0.7 -3.8 1.4 -0.7 0.5 42.1
1996 0.0 -4.0 -10.4 -3.6 -3.3 -6.6 43.2
1997 0.0 -4.1 -9.6 0.0 -0.1 0.8 42.0
1998 0.5 -1.8 -13.7 0.5 2.2 -4.0 41.4
1999 -1.8 -6.3 -17.8 -2.3 -4.4 -4.1 52.6
2000 10.7 -5.0 -9.3 12.5 1.3 8.5 54.4
2001 6.2 -7.9 -15.0 -4.6 -3.0 -5.6 104.3
2002 4.5 -8.4 -13.7 -1.7 -0.5 1.3 90.7
2003 5.1 -7.9 -10.6 0.7 0.6 3.1 80.6
2004 5.7 -5.9 -7.6 0.5 1.9 2.9 74.9
2005 7.3 -1.0 -2.6 1.7 5.0 5.1 68.9
2006 6.0 -0.1 -2.4 -1.3 0.8 0.2 63.0
Notes: 
a Author's calculations. See appendix for details.  
Three episodes are identified: 1994-95, 2000, and 2003-05. Following Alesina 
and  Ardagna  (1988),  the  averages  of  various  fiscal  indicators  ’before’,  ‘during’,  and 
‘after’ each fiscal consolidation periods are given in Table 2. Only in the 2003-05 fiscal 
consolidation,  the  interest  expenditures  and  public  debt-to-GDP  ratios  declined  both 
during  and  after  the  episode  with  respect  to  the  period  preceding  the  consolidation. 
Moreover,  the  reductions  in  these  ratios  are  rather  sharp.  Note  also  the  significant 
increase in structural and operational balances in the last consolidation episode.    8 
Table 2. Fiscal performance (% of GDP)
 Cyclically Cyclically 
adjusted adjusted Cyclically
primary operational Structural adjusted Non-interest Interest Public
balance balance balance revenues expenditures expenditures debt
1. 1994-1995
Before: 1992-93 (a) -0.9 -3.6 -6.2 17.2 18.1 4.8 40.3
During:  1994-95 (b) 2.9 -0.3 -4.0 18.7 15.8 8.5 47.1
After:    1996-97 (c) 0.0 -4.0 -10.0 19.3 19.2 11.2 42.6
Difference: (b) - (a) 3.9 3.2 2.2 1.5 -2.4 3.7 6.8
                  (c) - (a) 1.0 -0.5 -3.8 2.1 1.1 6.4 2.3
2. 2000
Before: 1998-99 (a) -0.6 -4.1 -15.7 23.3 24.0 17.5 47.0
During: 2000 (b) 10.7 -5.0 -9.3 26.4 15.7 25.5 54.4
After:   2001-02 (c) 5.3 -8.2 -14.3 27.9 22.6 20.9 97.5
Difference: (b) - (a) 11.4 -0.9 6.4 3.1 -8.3 7.9 7.4
                  (c) - (a) 6.0 -4.1 1.4 4.6 -1.4 3.3 50.5
3. 2003-2005
Before: 2001-02 (a) 5.3 -8.2 -14.3 27.9 22.6 20.9 97.5
During: 2003-05 (b) 6.0 -4.9 -6.9 27.0 21.0 12.9 74.8
After:   2006 (c) 6.0 -0.1 -2.4 28.5 22.4 8.0 63.0
Difference: (b) - (a) 0.7 3.3 7.4 -0.9 -1.6 -7.9 -22.7
                  (c) - (a) 0.7 8.1 11.9 0.6 -0.1 -12.9 -34.5
Notes: 
a Author's calculations. See appendix for details.  
 Macroeconomic performance 
Table  3  documents  the  macroeconomic  performance  around  the  fiscal 
consolidation  episodes.  The  2003-05  episode  is  significantly  different  than  its 
predecessors  both causing  and sustaining  high  growth,  sharply  reducing  inflation and 
interest rates and leading to confidence build-up (an increase in confidence index and a 
decline in Turkish spreads measured by the EMBI index, which we will turn to in Section 
IV). Note the distinguished behaviour of private investment and consumption in the last 
consolidation attempt. Table 4 compares the growth performance of Turkey with respect 
to various country groups in the same period. Only in the last fiscal consolidation episode, 
the difference between the growth rates of ‘during and before’ and ‘after and before’ 
periods are higher than all of the country groups shown in the table.   9 
Table 3. Macroeconomic performance 
Cp Ip Cg Ig Y π R r RER Confidence EMBI
   growth rates (%) (%) (%) (%) index index index
1. 1994-1995
Before: 1992-93 (a) 5.9 19.7 4.6 3.9 6.3 68.1 86.6 11.1 116.4 100.2
During:  1994-95 (b) 0.2 4.4 1.6 -23.6 1.6 97.7 140.6 21.7 96.2 95.2
After:    1996-97 (c) 8.4 12.0 6.4 26.4 7.5 83.0 129.3 25.4 106.1 103.4
Difference: (b) - (a) -5.7 -15.3 -3.0 -27.5 -4.7 29.6 54.0 10.7 -20.3 -5.1
                  (c) - (a) 2.6 -7.7 1.7 22.5 1.1 14.9 42.7 14.3 -10.4 3.1
2. 2000
Before: 1998-99 (a) -1.0 -13.0 7.2 2.6 -0.7 74.8 112.6 21.6 120.8 88.1 511.0
During: 2000 (b) 6.2 16.0 7.1 19.6 7.3 54.9 36.2 -12.1 136.5 101.0 488.9
After:   2001-02 (c) -3.5 -20.1 -1.6 -6.6 0.2 49.7 81.2 21.0 118.9 89.4 825.0
Difference: (b) - (a) 7.2 29.0 0.0 17.0 8.0 -19.8 -76.4 -33.7 15.7 12.9 -22.1
                  (c) - (a) -2.6 -7.0 -8.7 -9.2 0.9 -25.1 -31.4 -0.6 -2.0 1.3 314.0
3. 2003-2005
Before: 2001-02 (a) -3.5 -20.1 -1.6 -6.6 0.2 49.7 81.2 21.0 118.9 89.4 825.0
During: 2003-05 (b) 8.5 29.8 0.2 3.2 7.4 14.4 29.0 12.8 146.7 104.6 418.4
After:   2006 (c) 5.2 17.4 9.6 -0.2 6.1 8.6 18.0 8.7 160.5 102.4 225.6
Difference: (b) - (a) 12.0 49.9 1.7 9.8 7.2 -35.3 -52.2 -8.2 27.8 15.2 -406.6
                  (c) - (a) 8.8 37.4 11.2 6.4 5.9 -41.1 -63.1 -12.4 41.7 13.0 -599.4
Notes: Cp: private consumption; Ip: private investment; Cg: government consumption; Ig: government investment;
Y: gdp; π: consumer inflation rate; R: Treasury borrowing rate; r: real interest rate; RER: real exchange rate, 1995=100,
an increase denotes real appreaciation; confidence index is the Central Bank business confidence index and EMBI is
the JP Morgan's emerging market bond index (Turkey's spread). See section IV and appendix for details. Except GDP
and its components all of the values denote annual averages.  
III. Balance Sheet Effects 
Financial deepening 
Özatay  and  Sak  (2002)  investigate  underlying  reasons  of  the  2001  crisis  in 
Turkey. They focus on the banking sector structure in the period preceding the crisis as 
the potential culprit and provide strong evidence that point to the weakness of the banking 
sector. After 1992, growing government debt instruments outstanding and the increasing 
financing needs of the Treasury led the government to finance some activities through 
loans from state banks. Instead of repaying the principal and the interest accrued, the 
Treasury allowed these nonperforming loans to be treated as performing loans by the state 
banks.
7 Consequently, the state banks, which approximately constituted 40 percent of the 
                                                 
7 The Treasury was directly controlling these banks and at that period it was also the banking 
supervision authority.   10 
assets of the banking system at that time, were extremely dependent on overnight funds. 
Within  the  private  banking  system  there  were some  midsize  banks  that  were heavily 
concentrated  in  government  debt  instrument  business.  As  the  state  banks,  they  were 
carrying these instruments by borrowing in the extreme short. 
Table 4. Relative growth performance of Turkey with respect to various country groups
a
   Central and       Western 
Turkey  Eastern Europe
b          Asean 4
c      Hemisphere            BRICK
d
g (%)  g (%) ∆  g (%) ∆  g (%) ∆ g (%) ∆
1. 1994-1995
Before:  1992-93 (a) 6.3 -2.5 8.8 6.3 0.1 3.9 2.5 6.2 0.1
During:  1994-95 (b) 1.6 4.5 -2.8 7.8 -6.1 3.3 -1.7 6.9 -5.3
After:    1996-97 (c) 7.5 3.6 3.8 5.4 2.1 4.4 3.1 6.4 1.1
Difference: (b) - (a) -4.7 6.9 -11.7 1.5 -6.2 -0.6 -4.2 0.7 -5.5
                  (c) - (a) 1.1 6.1 -5.0 -0.9 2.0 0.6 0.6 0.2 0.9
2. 2000
Before: 1998-99 (a) -0.7 2.6 -3.3 -3.1 2.4 1.3 -2.0 5.2 -6.0
During: 2000 (b) 7.3 3.9 3.4 5.8 1.5 3.9 3.4 7.3 -0.1
After:   2001-02 (c) 0.2 3.1 -2.9 3.6 -3.4 0.4 -0.2 6.3 -6.1
Difference: (b) - (a) 8.0 1.3 6.7 8.9 -0.9 2.6 5.4 2.1 5.9
                  (c) - (a) 0.9 0.5 0.4 6.7 -5.8 -0.9 1.8 1.0 -0.1
3. 2003-2005
Before: 2001-02 (a) 0.2 3.1 -2.9 3.6 -3.4 0.4 -0.2 6.3 -6.1
During: 2003-05 (b) 7.4 5.0 2.3 5.5 1.9 4.3 3.0 8.2 -0.8
After:   2006 (c) 6.1 6.4 -0.2 5.4 0.7 5.5 0.6 9.3 -3.1
Difference: (b) - (a) 7.2 1.9 5.3 1.9 5.3 3.9 3.2 1.9 5.2
                  (c) - (a) 5.9 3.3 2.7 1.8 4.1 5.1 0.8 3.0 2.9
Notes:
 a For country composition of groups and data, see International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook.
Country group composites are weighted by GDP valued at purchasing power parities as a share of total group GDP
 g: GDP growth rate, ∆: the diffrence between the growth rates of Turkey and the relevant country group.
b Turkey is excluded from Central and Eastern Europe by the author. 
c Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand.
d Brazil, Russia, India, China, Korea.  
This weakness which continuously increased in the second half of the 1990’s and 
reached a record high level during the second fiscal consolidation episode is one of the 
important reasons why the first two fiscal contractions were not successful.  However, 
economic program in the post-crisis period first stopped the deterioration in the banking 
sector and then improved its strength. Problematic private banks were taken over by the 
Savings  and  Deposit  Insurance  Fund.  The  overnight  borrowing  of  these  banks  was   11 
significantly reduced, and some of the banks were recapitalized or merged, or both, while 
some were actually sold. There was a dramatic change in the governance structure of 
state-owned banks. Accumulated debts of the Treasury to these banks were paid and the 
state banks were recapitalized. The number of branches and employees were significantly 
reduced. These measures which jumped the public debt-to-GDP ratio by 50 percentage 
points and immediately led to widespread sustainability concerns could not have been 
taken without the ambitious and sustained fiscal consolidation of the post-crisis period. 
As we show below, as time passed, the fiscal consolidation diminished such concerns.    
The  sharp  decrease  in  default  risk  of  the  government  and  the  eventual 
improvement in business confidence reduced risks of the banking sector that accumulated 
to record high levels in the period preceding the crisis. For example, the share of non-
performing loans in the loan portfolio dropped to 3.8 percent in 2006 from 25 percent in 
2001  (Central  Bank  of  Turkey  (2007)).  The  strengthening  of  the  regulation  and 
supervision in the post-crisis period played an important role in improving the banks’ 
balance sheets as well. Consequently, the credit extension capacity of the banking sector 
improved. Though Turkish financial markets are still shallow relative to the developed 
world, the restructuring in the banking sector and the fiscal consolidation of the post-
crisis period has increased credit to private sector-to-GDP ratio since 2002.
8 Especially, 
consumer credit volume expanded significantly, which as we argue below, played an 
important role in boosting private consumption demand (Table 5). 
                                                 
8 For example, in 2006, the credit to private sector-to-GDP ratio  was %94 in France,  %85 in 
Greece, %95 in South Korea, %149 in Portugal, and %163.9 in the UK, whereas it was %29 in 
Turkey. Figures are from the “Financial Structure Dataset” of the World Bank.    12 
Table 5. Indicators of financial depth (% of GDP)
TA CRco CRhh CRp CRg CR
1. 1994-1995
Before:  1992-93 (a) 40.1 13.8 0.6 14.4 5.4 19.8
During:  1994-95 (b) 39.7 12.2 1.1 13.3 5.3 18.7
After:    1996-97 (c) 45.2 15.9 1.4 17.3 7.8 25.1
Difference: (b) - (a) -0.4 -1.6 0.5 -1.1 0.0 -1.1
                  (c) - (a) 5.1 2.1 0.8 2.9 2.4 5.3
2. 2000
Before: 1998-99 (a) 61.8 17.1 2.3 19.4 17.4 36.9
During: 2000 (b) 73.7 15.6 3.5 19.1 25.3 44.4
After:   2001-02 (c) 75.2 14.2 2.9 17.1 27.9 45.0
Difference: (b) - (a) 11.9 -1.5 1.2 -0.3 7.9 7.6
                  (c) - (a) 13.4 -2.9 0.6 -2.3 10.5 8.2
3. 2003-2005
Before: 2001-02 (a) 75.2 14.2 2.9 17.1 27.9 45.0
During: 2003-05 (b) 66.0 13.3 4.9 18.2 26.1 44.3
After:   2006 (c) 74.7 19.1 10.0 29.0 24.7 53.8
Difference: (b) - (a) -9.2 -0.9 1.9 1.0 -1.7 -0.7
                  (c) - (a) -0.6 4.9 7.0 11.9 -3.2 8.7
Notes: TA: total assets; CRco: credit to the corporate sector; CRhh: credit to households;
CRp=CRco+CRhh. CRg: claims on the government. CR=CRp+CRg. Financial variables are adjusted
for the effects of inflation using the methodology of Financial Structure Dataset, World Bank.
See appendix for the details.  
Crowding-in the corporate sector 
Kaplan et al. (2006) show that the share of financial assets in total assets of the 
non-financial firms in Turkey is relatively large when compared internationally, in the 
1990-2004 period. They are mainly in form of government securities and time deposits 
average maturity of which are extremely short, except for the last two years of their 
sample. Based on panel estimates for a sample of almost 5000 non-financial firms per 
year,  they  show  that  firms’  demand  for  financial  assets  increase  by  macroeconomic 
uncertainty (as the public sector borrowing requirement-to-GDP ratio increases and real 
sector  confidence  index  of  the  Central  Bank  of  Turkey  (CBT)  indicates  a  decline). 
Moreover,  using  the  same  panel,  they  analyse  the  determinants  of  firms’  investment   13 
behaviour and find financial crowding out: they find that a rise in public sector borrowing 
requirement is detrimental to non-financial firms’ investment expenditures. 
While analysing the evolution of the strength of the corporate sector is beyond the 
scope of this study, given these findings, it is natural to expect an increase in firms’ 
physical investment by a credible fiscal consolidation program that reduces debt and real 
interest rates and increases confidence. As is shown below, this is indeed the case.  
IV. Fiscal Consolidation and Confidence 
Default risk on the Turkish government debt 
A  standard  measure  of  default  risk  of  an  emerging  country  is  that  country’s 
component of the EMBI spread, which is the difference between the yield on emerging 
country  sovereign  bonds  and  the  yield  on  bonds  issued  by  a  government  of  the 
industrialized  world  with  identical  currency  denomination  and  maturity.  Favero  and 
Giavazzi (2005) show that, in Brazil, important financial variables, like exchange rates 
and domestic interest rates, fluctuated parallel to the EMBI spread over the 1999-2003 
period. Ersel and Özatay (2008) document similar evidence for Turkey for the post-crisis 
period. Blanchard (2005) shows that the Brazilian spread and the probability of default 
moved together over the 1995-2003 period. The daily evolution of the Turkish component 
of the EMBI spread in the 30 July 1999 – 26 December 2006 period is shown in Figure 1. 
To  test  the  factors  behind  spread  fluctuations,  we  first  estimate  a  long-run 
equation of the form 
∑
=
+ + + + =
n
i
t t i i t t t u x r s
1
, 2 1 0 β θ α α α ,          (1)   14 
where s is spread, α0 is the constant term, r is the Federal Reserve target rate, θ is a proxy 
for the risk appetite of foreign investors, xi is the i
th domestic macroeconomic variable, 
and u is the error term. The target rate directly measures the effect of international interest 
rate changes on spreads. Our proxy for the risk appetite of investors is the volatility 
implicit in US stock options and compiled by the Chicago Board Options Exchange -so 
called ‘VIX’.
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Fig. 1. Turkish component of the EMBI spread: 30 July 1999 – 26 December 2006 
The augmented Dickey-Fuller tests indicate that variables used in the regressions 
are  not  stationary  in  level  terms  (not  shown).  To  capture  short-run  dynamics,  while 
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9 An alternative for VIX is the spread between 10-year US corporate bonds with BBB ratings (junk 
bonds)  and  10-year  US  Treasury  bonds.  The  estimation  results  are  robust  to  this  alternative 
specification and we do not report them.    15 
where ∆ is the first difference operator, γ0 is the constant term,  ec is the residual of the 
long-term equation (the error-correction term) and ε is the residual term. 
Table 6. Determinants of the Turkish component of EMBI spreads
Daily: 30.7.1999-31.12.2006 Quarterly: 1999.III- 2006.IV







Constant 8.138 (48.9) -0.0005 (-0.8) 3.121 (5.8) -0.002 (-0.1)
FED target rate (logged)
    Level 0.005 (0.7) 0.095 (1.1)
    First difference -0.021 (-0.6) 0.036 (0.2)
Global volatility index (logged)
    Level 0.634 (28.1)                  1.167 (8.6)
    First difference 0.077 (6.6) 0.870 (5.1)
S&P rating (logged)
    Level -1.814 (35.1)
    First difference -0.215 (-2.5)
Public debt-to-GDP ratio (logged)
    Level 0.881 (3.2)
    First difference 0.973 (2.6)
Primary surplus-to-GDP ratio
    Level -4.246 (-1.5)
    First difference -6.657 (-2.1)
Error-correction term -0.005 (-1.7) -0.621 (-3.0)
Co-integration t-statistic -3.71 -4.45








2 0.86 0.03 0.87 0.64
Notes:
 a Numbers in parantheses are t-Statistics.
b The dependent variable is the log of EMBI spread.
c The dependent variables is the first difference of logged EMBI spread.
d Reported values are p-values.  
We  use  both  daily  and  quarterly  data.  Following  the  empirical  literature  on 
spreads  that  uses  high  frequency  data,  we  proxy  domestic  variables  by  sovereign   16 
ratings.
10 When quarterly data (averages of daily variables where relevant) is used, public 
debt-to-GDP  and  primary  surplus-to-GDP  ratios  are  included  to  replace  ratings.  The 
estimation results of the long-term equations are given in the first and third columns of 
Table 6. The signs of all of the coefficients are as expected a-priori. The rating, global 
volatility index and debt-to-GDP ratio are significant. The short-run results are given in 
the second and fourth columns of Table 6. For the high frequency data, in addition to 
rating and risk appetite variables, the error-correction term is also significant. Except the 
target  rate,  all  of  the  variables  have  the  correct  signs.  In  the  quarterly  estimate,  risk 
appetite, primary surplus-to-GDP and public debt-to-GDP ratios, and the error correction 
term are significant and have the correct signs. These results indicate that an improvement 
in  domestic  macroeconomic  fundamentals  and  an  increase  in  risk  appetite  of  foreign 
investors  reduce  default  risk.
11 Furthermore,  they  show  that  fiscal  consolidations  that 
reduce public debt decrease default risk and its potential perverse effects on the real 
economy. 
Business confidence 
The CBT, since December 1987, has been publishing a real sector confidence 
index. This is a diffusion index obtained as a weighted average of various qualitative 
                                                 
10 Cantor and Packer (1996, pp.49), for a cross-section of thirty-five countries show that sovereign 
ratings  effectively  summarize  and  supplement  the  information  contained  in  macroeconomic 
indicators. Kamin and Kleist (1999) use ratings instead of various country performance variables. 
Similarly,  Kaminsky  and  Schmukler  (2002),  to  proxy  domestic  macroeconomic  fundamentals, 
employ rating and outlook changes. Our assignment of numerical values to credit ratings is in 
essence as in Kamin and Kleist (1999). However, following Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) we 
account for outlook changes as well. See data appendix for the details. 
11 Özatay et al. (2007), using high frequency panel data for 18 emerging countries, confirm these 
findings. Çulha et al. (2006) analyze possible effects of news releases on spreads during the 16 
May 2001-31 December 2004 period. They classify news into three categories: (1) political news; 
(2) announcements by the IMF; (3) structural reform process towards the EU accession. Note that the 
first two of these categories are closely correlated with the continuation of the fiscal consolidation 
program. Their results show that news variables are always highly significant.     17 
answers  given  to  a  monthly  business  tendency  survey  and  shown  in  Figure  2.
12 By 
construction,  index  values  above  100  denote  optimistic  expectations  regarding  the 
economic activity. The sharp turnaround in business confidence in the post-crisis period 
is evident. There is only one observation below 100 in the post-crisis period and it is 
related to the Iraq war (first quarter of 2003). Note that there were similar improvements 
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Fig. 2. Business confidence index: January 1988 – December 2006 
We,  first,  investigate  the  influence  of  fiscal  policy  on  the  logged  business 
confidence index. Fiscal consolidation is represented by the evolution of public debt-to-
GDP  ratio.  Second,  the  impact  of  first  difference  of  logged  EMBI  spread  on  the 
confidence index is searched.
13 It is a-priori expected that as the debt-to-GDP ratio and 
default  risk  decrease  there  will  be  a  parallel  and  significant  increase  in  business 
                                                 
12 See appendix for details. 
13 The business confidence index is I(0), whereas the spread and debt-to-GDP ratio are I(1).   18 
confidence, which later is shown to be one of the determinants of short run changes in 
private investment. The results given in Table 7 are in line with this expectation. Fiscal 
policy as reflected by the debt ratio and default risk both individually and taken together 
significantly affect the real sector confidence.
14 
Table 7. The impact of default risk and debt ratio on business confidence
a
I II III
Constant 2.138 (4.2) 1.93 (5.4) 2.638 (5.9)
Lbct-1 0.532 (4.8) 0.576 (7.3) 0.424 (4.4)
Distributed lag of the first difference
  of the logged EMBI spread 
b -0.152 (-4.4) -0.101 (-3.4)
The first difference of the logged
  public debt-to-GDP ratio -0.521 (-4.7) -0.435 (-3.8)
Sample 1999.III-2006.IV 1988.I-2006.IV 1999.III-2006.IV
  Adjusted R
2 0.76 0.57 0.83
  First order autocorrelation test
c 0.65 0.22 0.25
  Fourth order autocorrelation test
c 0.91 0.59 0.07
  First order ARCH test
c 0.56 0.07 0.46
Notes:
 a The dependent variable is the log confidence index (Lbct). The values in parantheses are the t-statistics.
b It consists of the equally weighted average of the current value and the first two lags of this variable.
c Reported values are the p-values.  
V. Fiscal Consolidation and Behaviour of Private Sector 
Private investment 
We investigate determinants of private investment by referring to a fairly standard 
investment function. The accelerator effect, the user cost of capital, credit availability and 
the option value of waiting are our explanatory variables.
15, 16 The accelerator (various 
                                                 
14 As a robustness test, we replace debt ratio by real primary budget balance. This variable is also 
highly significant and has the expected (positive) sign. We do not report these results in Table 5.  
15 For such a function, see, for example, Agenor (2004, pp: 53-67).   19 
lags of income) and real volume of credit should have positive coefficients. The option 
value of waiting and user cost should be negatively correlated with private investment. 
Note that as business confidence increases the option value of waiting decreases. Hence, 
we proxy the option value of waiting by business confidence. Note further that, as shown 
above, in the period analyzed fiscal consolidation (decline in debt to GDP ratio) caused 
an improvement in the business confidence. 
Table 8. Determinants of private investment: 1987.I - 2006.IV





 Constant -0.275 (-0.16) -1.588 (-4.54)
 GDP 0.513 (2.06)
 Real credit volume 0.365 (3.56)
 Business confidence index 0.35 (4.55)
 ∆ real credit volume
d 0.316 (2.73)





 Co-integration t-statistics -2.04
 First order autocorrelation test (p-value) 0.74
 Fourth order autocorrelation test (p-value) 0.98
 First order ARCH test (p-value) 0.60
Notes:
 a Numbers in parantheses are t-statistics.
b The dependent variable is the logged real private investment.
c The dependent variable is the first difference of the logged real private investment.
d ∆
 is the first difference operator.  
We estimate both a long-run and a short-run investment equation. As the long-run 
determinants  of  private  investment,  we  consider  real  GDP  and  real  credit  volume 
extended  to  private  firms.  While  the  results  do  not  indicate  co-integration,  we  still 
maintain the error-correction term in the short-run equation. Other significant short run 
                                                                                                                                      
16 Blanchard (1990) notes that fiscal consolidation will eventually decrease uncertainty leading to a 
decrease  in  precautionary  savings  and  reduce  option  value  of  waiting  by  consumers  to  buy 
durables and by firms to take investment decisions.   20 
determinants are the business confidence index and the first difference of the real volume 
of credit.
17 All of the signs of the coefficients of the variables are in line with a-priori 
expectations (Table 8). Though the user of capital is correctly signed, it is not significant 
and not retained in the final estimate. These results indicate that, in the period analyzed 
both  business  confidence  and  credit  to  corporate  sector  played  an  important  role  in 
determining private investment. 
Private consumption 
The  change  of  consumption  (consumption  of  non-durables  and  services)  is 
unforecastable under the permanent income hypothesis: 
t t u c + = ∆ α   
where ct is the log of consumption, α is a constant term and ut is innovation in the log of 
consumption which is orthogonal to all variables known at time t-1 or before. In contrast 
to  what  permanent  income  hypothesis  suggests,  various  empirical  studies  show  that 
changes in consumption is significantly correlated with predictable changes in income:
18 
t t t t u y E c + ∆ + = ∆ −1 β α   
where Et-1(xt) denotes the expected value of xt as of t-1 and yt is the log of disposable 
income. The results of these studies indicate that β is significant and greater than zero but 
less than one. This fact is mainly explained by the existence of at least a proportion of 
consumers which are liquidity-constrained. However, as argued by Bachetta and Gerlach 
(1997, pp: 210), “if the liquidity constraint interpretation is taken to be seriously, credit 
should be incorporated in the analysis”. They show that forecastable (ex-ante) consumer 
                                                 
17 Private investment, real credit, and confidence variables are logged and the first two are de-
seasonalized by the tramo-seats methodology. See data appendix for further details. 
18 See, for example, Flavin (1981), Jappelli and Pagano (1989), Campbell and Mankiw (1989 and 
1991) and Deaton (1992).   21 
credit growth is a significant determinant of consumption growth in the United States, 
Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan and France. Ludvigson (1999) proposes a model 
with consumers whose access to credit varies stochastically with income to explain the 
sensitivity of consumption growth to predictable credit growth. He then shows that in US 
aggregate  data  predictable  growth  in  consumer  credit  is  significantly  related  to 
consumption growth. 
Given that the Turkish financial market is relatively thin compared to those of the 
developed world and Turkish consumers are much more credit-constrained, it is natural to 
expect a significant influence of consumer credit growth for the Turkish consumption 
growth. Following Bacchetta and Gerlach (1997) and Ludvigson (1999), we estimate the 
following equation: 
t t t t t t t t u rw E ccr E y E c + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ − − − 1 3 1 2 1 1 β β β α ,      (3) 
where ccr is the real consumer loan stock, rw is the difference between the Treasury 
borrowing rate and the deposit interest rate (wedge), and u is the error term.
19   
The  problem  with  the  estimation  of  (3)  is  that  the  expected  values  are  not 
observable: Furthermore, if expected values are proxied by the actual values then error 
term will be correlated with the explanatory variables. This renders estimation of (3) with 
OLS inappropriate. To overcome this problem, the procedure employed in practice is to 
estimate  (3)  by  instrumental  variables.  We  use  variables  lagged  at  least  twice  as 
instruments as in Baachetta and Gerlach (1997) and Ludvigson (1999). 
                                                 
19 Since lending rate for the whole sample is absent, we use the Treasury borrowing rate as a proxy 
for the lending rate. For details and description of the other variables see data appendix.   22 
Table 9. Determinants of private consumption: 1994.I - 2006.IV
(instrumental variables estimates)
a
Disposable income Consumer credit Wedge Adj. R
2
0.339 0.04 -0.0001




: a Disposable income and real private consumption is de-seasonalized by the Tramo-seats 
methodology. All of the variables except the wedge are logged and first differenced. Instruments: 
Lags from 2 to 4 of all of the variables and the second lag of the error correction term between
consumption and income. Numbers in parantheses are the t-Statistics.  
The  results  of  this  exercise  are  shown  in  Table  9.  Clearly,  changes  in  the 
consumer credit play an important role in explaining consumption growth. The wedge is 
correctly signed, but not significant. This may arise due to the lack of lending rate data. 
To check the robustness of our results, we further estimate (3) with the real interest rate 
instead of the wedge. Again the real interest rate is not significant, but correctly signed. 
VI. Conclusions 
This  paper  provides  new  evidence  for  expansionary  fiscal  contractions  from 
Turkey. We identify three fiscal consolidation episodes since 1990: 1994-95, 2000, and 
2003-05. The 2003-05 consolidation led to significantly different results than the first two. 
The program of 2000 suffered from the extreme weakness in the banking sector and 
consequently failed. The banking sector was both the cause and victim of the 2001 crisis.  
The 1994-95 fiscal consolidation effort short-lived and first seeds of the deterioration in 
the balance sheets of the banking sector were thrown during that period. Also, throughout 
the 1990’s – especially in the first half of the decade, consumer loans were almost non-
existent. In sharp contrast, the post-crisis economic program gave a special importance to   23 
strengthening the banking sector, which initially caused a jump in the public debt-to-GDP 
ratio.  Such  a  move  could  not  have  been  taken  without  the  sustained  and  ambitious 
consolidation  of  the  2003-05  period.  Moreover,  both  the  fiscal  consolidation  and 
restructuring program increased the credit expansion capacity of the banking industry.  
We show that both the credibility and expectations channel were operative in the 
2003-05 fiscal consolidation episode. The Turkish experience indicates that when balance 
sheet  weaknesses  are  extreme,  without  addressing  them,  it  is  highly  difficult,  if  not 
impossible,  for  a  fiscal  consolidation  effort  to  be  successful.  The  corollary  is  that 
empirical research that use panel estimations, should control for balance sheet differences 
between the countries. 
Despite  the  importance  given  to  credibility  channel  in  theory,  the  empirical 
research has relied almost entirely on primary budget balance figures. In contrast, we 
identified  the  consolidation  episodes  using  three  alternative  budget  balance  figures: 
primary, operative and total budget. For further research, one wonders whether fiscal 
consolidation episodes identified based on budget balance data inclusive of nominal or 
real interest payments (hence, taking the credibility effects into consideration) will change 
the results of earlier studies. 
A  final  note  is  on  the  role  of  the  appreciation  in  the  post-crisis  growth 
performance. Immediately after the crisis, Turkey started to implement floating exchange 
rate regime. Since then, the CBT has rarely intervened in the foreign exchange market. 
Hence, the real appreciation trend of the lira documented in Table 3 is the outcome of 
market forces not due to deliberate actions of the CBT. The most obvious consequence of 
appreciation is its negative impact on demand for domestically produced goods. However, 
in  highly  dollarized  countries,  it  can  also  affect  output  through  an  entirely  different   24 
mechanism. Kesriyeli et al. (2005) document that liability dollarization of the Turkish 
corporate sector firms is extremely high. Kara et al. (2007), using the extended Kalman 
filter method estimate the time-varying impact of the real exchange on output gap. They 
show that appreciation leads to a rise in the output gap leading to expansion in economic 
activity.  These  findings  indicate  the  possibility  that  expansionary  effects  of  fiscal 
consolidations in emerging markets can be sensitive to the initial level of dollarization. 
This is another avenue for future research.  
Appendix: Data Sources and Definitions 
Tables 1 and 2: Raw data is from the Treasury and the State Planning Organization and 
can be downloaded from http://www.hazine.gov.tr and http://www.dpt.gov.tr. We filtered 
out two one-off effects on the primary budget: privatization revenues and ‘duty losses’. 
Duty losses were in fact budget expenditures but not shown in the budget in the 1994-
2000  period.  For  example,  before  2001,  agricultural  support  schemes  were  operated 
through state owned banks rendering these banks to register serious losses.
20 Using the 
terminology  of  Burnside  et  al.  (2001),  we  can  name  them  as  prospective  deficits 
associated with implicit bailout guarantees to failing (public) banking system. 
Cyclically  adjusted  primary  balance/GDP  =  Cyclically  adjusted  primary  revenues 
(excluding privatization revenues)/GDP – Observed primary expenditures (including duty 
losses)/GDP. 
PRt / GDPt = 13.7 + 0.95*trend - 0.12*Ut + et (1990-2006, annual data).   (A1) 
PR: primary revenues net of privatization; U: unemployment rate; e: error term. 
                                                 
20 See Treasury (2001).   25 
Cyclically adjusted primary revenues /GDP at period t is then calculated using A1 with 
Ut-1 instead of Ut .
21 
Structural balance / GDP = B – T + T (Y*/Y). 
B: Observed budget balance (net of privatization revenues and duty losses) / GDP. 
T: Observed budget revenues (net of transfers) / GDP; Y: GDP; Y*: potential output 
calculated by the Hodrick-Prescott filter using annualized quarterly data for the period 
1990-2006. 
Cyclically adjusted operational balance / GDP = Cyclically adjusted primary revenues / 
GDP – Observed primary expenditures (including duty losses accumulated in state banks’ 
balance sheets) / GDP – RE / GDP. 
RE = real interest expenditures = (Nominal interest expenditures / GDP) / (1 + annual 
average inflation rate). 
Table  3:  All  data,  except  EMBI,  can  be  downloaded  from  the  CBT  web  side: 
http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/data/statistical data/general statistics; EMBI: JP Morgan. See JP 
Morgan (2004) for details. 
Table 4: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database for October 
2007. 
Table  5:  All  original  data  for  the  banking  sector  is  from  http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/ 
data/statistical data/general statistics/deposit money banks (or the other bank types). The 
banking sector includes deposit money banks, investment and development banks and 
participation  banks.  We  adjust  the  stock  variables  (financial  variables)  and  the  flow 
variables (GDP) for the impact of inflation. Adjustment methodology is taken from the 
                                                 
21 The method is identical to that used in Alesina and Perotti (1995, pp. 213). 
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Financial  Structure  Dataset,  World  Bank:  http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ 
INTRES/Resources/469232_1107449512766/FinStructure_60_06_final.xls. 
Table 6: Sovereign ratings of Turkey (S&P), Global volatility index (VIX), FED target 
rate: Bloomberg. The assignment of numerical values to sovereign ratings is as in Kamin 
and Kleist (2002), with 1 being the worst credit risk and 22 the best. We augmented the 
ratings with the outlook changes. Following Rozada and Levy-Yeyati (2006), we interpret 
the outlook as a five-notch grading scale around the credit rating: positive, positive watch, 
neutral, negative watch, and negative. The outlook augmented ratings are computed by 
giving each notch a 0.2 value and adding to the credit rating. 
Table  7:  Business  confidence  index:  CBT  web  side:  http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/data/ 
statistical  data/general  statistics/confidence  index-real  sector:  real  sector  confidence 
index.  The  methodology  of  the  index  is  briefly  discussed  at  the  same  web  side: 
publications/periodic publications/business tendency survey and real sector confidence 
index. Quarterly figures are the quarter averages of monthly data.     
Table  8:  Credit  to  corporate  sector:  CBT  web  side: 
http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/data/statistical  data/general  statistics/deposit  money  banks-
credits-sectoral  breakdown-credit  to  private  firms  +  data/statistical  data/general 
statistics/investment  banks  -credits-sectoral  breakdown-credit  to  private  firms.  The 
deflator for the private investment is used to obtain its real value. Quarterly figures are the 
quarter averages of monthly data. 
Table  9:  Consumer  credit:  Obtained  from  the  CBT  web  side: 
http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/data/statistical  data/general  statistics/deposit  money  banks-
credits-sectoral breakdown-households. The deflator for the non-durables and services   27 
consumption is used to obtain its real value. Quarterly figures are the quarter averages of 
monthly data. 
Disposable income: GDP less indirect taxes plus transfers. The last two variables are 
from the web sides of the Treasury and the State Planning Organization. The deflator for 
the non-durables and services consumption is used to obtain its real value. 
Wedge:  Difference  between  the  Treasury  borrowing  rate  and  deposit  interest  rate. 
Borrowing rate is from the web side of the Treasury. Deposit rate is the weighted average 
of deposit rates at all maturities. Weights are the shares of deposits at total deposits. The 
relevant  data  can  be  downloaded  from  the  CBT  web  side: 
http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/data/statistical  data/general  statistics/deposit  money 
banks/deposits. Quarterly figures are averages of monthly figures. 
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